



# SCION: A Secure Multipath Interdomain Routing Architecture

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
# SCION Architecture Design Goals

- **High availability**, even for networks with malicious parties
  - Adversary: access to management plane of router
  - Communication should be available if adversary-free path exists
- **Secure entity authentication**  
that scales to global heterogeneous (dis)trusted environment
- **Flexible trust**: enable selection of trust roots
- **Transparent operation**: clear what is happening to packets and whom needs to be relied upon for operation
- **Balanced control** among ISPs, senders, and receivers
- **Scalability, efficiency, flexibility**




# Approach for Scalability: Isolation Domain (ISD)

- Isolation Domain (ISD): grouping of ASes
- ISD core: ASes that manage the ISD
- Core AS: AS that is part of ISD core
- Control plane is organized hierarchically
  - Inter-ISD control plane
  - Intra-ISD control plane



# Path Creation: Local ISD


- Client requests path segments to <ISD, AS> from local path server
- If down-path segments are not locally cached, local path server send request to core path server
- Local path server replies
  - Up-path segments to local ISD core ASes
  - Down-path segments to <ISD, AS>
  - Core-path segments as needed to connect up-path and down-path segments






# Path Creation: Remote ISD

- Host contacts local path server requesting <ISD, AS>
- If path segments are not cached, local path server will contact core path server
- If core path server does not have path segments cached, it will contact remote core path server
- Finally, host receives up-, core-, and down-segments




# SCION Summary


- Complete re-design of network architecture resolves numerous fundamental problems
  - BGP protocol convergence issues
  - Separation of control and data planes
  - Isolation of mutually untrusted control planes
  - Path control by senders and receivers
  - Simpler routers (no forwarding tables)
  - Root of trust selectable by each ISD
- An **isolation architecture** for the **control plane**, but a **transparency architecture** for the **data plane**.




# Deployment @ ETH




# Use Case: IoT Protection through Default Off



# SCIONLab



# SCIONLab Network






# SCION Visualization System

## SCION AS Visualization

- [SCION Website](#)
- [SCION on Github](#)
- [SCION Visualizations on Github](#)

Source AS:  Destination AS:  Data:


SCIOND IP Address:



# Application: IoT Access



# Swiss SCION Network




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
# Growing Global Testbed

- Over 40 deployed SCION routers and servers




# SCION AS runs on ODROID and Raspberry Pi

**ODROID**  
Hardkernel



Raspberry Pi



# Belief that Internet is Immutable

- Evidence appears overwhelming that Internet is immutable: IPv6, BGPSEC, DNSSEC, etc.
- However, benefits are limited, esp. for early deployers
- Our goal: provide many benefits, even for early adopters, such that one cannot turn back





# Conclusions

- SCION is a secure Internet architecture that we can start using today
- Open source
- Numerous opportunities for researchers
  - Multipath routing architecture offers multitude of path choices for meaningful diverse path selection
  - Security: routing, DDoS, source authentication
  - Next-generation PKI architecture
- Natural quality scalability with increasing global adoption

# SCION Projekt Team

- Netsec: Daniele Asoni, Chen Chen, Laurent Chuat, Sergiu Costea, Sam Hitz, Tobias Klausmann, Tae-Ho Lee, Chris Pappas, **Adrian Perrig**, Benjamin Rotenberger, Stephen Shirley, Jean-Pierre Smith, Pawel Szalachowski, Brian Trammell, Ercan Ucan
- Infsec: **David Basin**, Tobias Klenze, Christoph Sprenger, Thilo Weghorn
- Programming Methodology: Marco Eilers, **Peter Müller**





[www.anapaya.net](http://www.anapaya.net)

# Additional Information

- <https://www.scion-architecture.net>
  - Book
  - Papers
  - Videos
  - Newsletter signup
- <https://www.anapaya.net>
  - Commercializing SCION equipment
- <https://github.com/netsec-ethz/scion>